Around the Fed : Why countries default by Doug Campbell
“The Economics of Sovereign Defaults.” Juan Carlos
Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, and Horacio Sapriza.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly,
Spring 2007, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 163-187.
N
ations have been defaulting on their debt for ages, and
recent history has certainly seen its share. Sovereign
defaults peaked at $335 billion worldwide in 1990 before 
easing through the early 1990s. Then began a new string of 
problems as Russia defaulted on billions of dollars of debt 
in 1998, roiling global markets. Argentina’s default of 
$82 billion was one of the largest recorded episodes in history. 
In a new paper published by the Richmond Fed, a trio 
of economists survey the vast literature on sovereign
defaults and conclude that even though there has been
progress in the understanding of the economics of sovereign
default, much remains unknown. Specifically, the precise
costs that nations weigh in deciding whether to default 
are not well understood. 
There is a consensus about what could be the main 
determinants of default episodes. Changes in external 
circumstances, such as unfavorable movement in interna-
tional capital markets, can make it difficult for emerging
countries to borrow at acceptable rates and terms. 
Changes in internal circumstances, such as declines 
in tax revenues during cyclical downturns or a change in
political circumstances, may also trigger a default decision.
The big debate on sovereign defaults centers on identi-
fying the costs associated with a default decision. Some
analysts believe that creditors impose higher borrowing
costs on nations that default. But the authors point out that
this would require an unlikely degree of coordination
among lenders in a time when international markets have
evolved to the point where “almost anyone” can buy 
sovereign bonds. Also, the notion that defaulters are
excluded from borrowing markets does not seem to be 
supported by empirical evidence. Finally, there may by 
“signaling costs” associated with a default. For instance, a
default may signal that the policymakers in office are 
less prone to respect property rights or it may signal 
that the prospects of the economy are worse than what
investors previously perceived. Though signaling costs
seem plausible, the importance of this mechanism is
unclear, the authors conclude.
Of particular interest to the authors are the political 
factors that drive default decisions. Some research has
found that changes in top policymakers — such as among
finance ministers — affect interest rate spreads, revealing
“important signals about the government’s future policy
course.” It is widely assumed that Argentina’s 2001 default
was driven in large part by political ousters. In an upcoming
paper, the same authors try to extend these insights about
political factors in default episodes. They develop a model
in which policymakers of different types alternate 
in power. They find that the model may help explain 
both the high and volatile nature of interest rates in 
emerging markets.
“The Role of Small and Large Businesses in Economic
Development.” Kelly Edmiston. Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Economic Review, Second Quarter 2007, vol. 92,
no. 2, pp. 73-97.
W
ith “smokestack chasing” increasingly out of favor,
communities are looking to pour their resources
into a different sort of economic development effort: 
cultivating entrepreneurs and encouraging existing 
businesses. Kansas City Fed economist Kelly Edmiston
argues that economic developers are shifting their strategies
to focus on small and local businesses. In this paper, she 
questions the effectiveness of this approach and ultimately
finds that it makes sense but with some caveats.
“Small businesses may not be quite the fountainhead of
job creation they are purported to be, especially when it
comes to high-paying jobs that are stable and offer good
benefits,” Edmiston writes. At the same time, small firms
create the majority of new jobs and are important innovators
in the economy. With recruitment of large enterprises
unlikely to be cost-effective or successful, “concentrating on
organic growth, or the growth of existing or ‘home-grown’
businesses, is likely to be a much more successful strategy.”
“Anxious Workers.” Rob Valletta. Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco Economic Letter, June 1, 2007, no. 2007-13.
U
nemployment is low, output is high, and jobs are 
plentiful. So why are American workers so worried
about keeping their jobs? The dynamism of the U.S. 
economy raises living standards, but it leads to a constant
churning of workers and firms.   
Robert Valletta of the San Francisco Fed digs into 
job tenure statistics and discovers some plausible reasons
for worker anxiety. Median job tenure has been falling since 
1983 for most workers, except for women aged 35 to 54.
Median tenure fell 30 percent for men aged 35 to 44 and 
38 percent for men aged 45 to 64, or from 12.8 years to 
8.1 years for this latter demographic. Meanwhile, firms 
are permanently laying off workers with more frequency, 
even highly educated workers. These findings, the 
author concludes, “lend credence to the view that worker
anxiety about job stability and security is real rather 
than illusory.”  RF
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